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INTRODUCTION

Those who finance terrorist attacks and rejoice in the
murder of innocent victims are no different from those who
plant the . bombs or carry the backpacks. Money is the
lifeblood of terrorism, and this master terrorist financier
richly deserves the maximum sentence imposed today.1
Both the academic and operational sides of counterterrorism
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have largely focused on questions pertaining to military action.
This has led to voluminous scholarship on topics of interrogation
standards, detainee status, targeted killing, and executive powers,
to name a few.
However, despite the importance of such
discussions, significant attention needs to be given to the powers
behind the "on-the-ground" terrorists. Specifically, attention must
be given to the individuals who finance terrorists; as such,
financiers themselves need to be considered terrorists.
There may be hundreds of men and women willing to carry a
bomb, but operationally eliminating one of them merely makes
room for another. However, only a small number of people act as
financiers of such attacks. Thus, while the use of military and law
enforcement in counterterrorism operations achieves the "on-theground" objectives of rooting out terrorists, legislators must take
proactive steps to permanently close the loopholes easily used by
unscrupulous investors. 2 Terror financiers are fewer and further
between and thus have a far greater individual impact on terrorism
themselves. Therefore, eliminating a single terror financier will
have a greater impact on preventing attacks than will merely
eliminating a few bomb-carriers.
As such, the bull's-eye of
counterterrorism must be expanded to larger concentric circles that
include not only the fighters, but also those providing material
support. This discussion does not argue for the killing of such
financiers, but rather for an acknowledgment that these
individuals must be pursued with the same intensity as the bombcarriers themselves.
In order to fully understand both terrorism and this discussion
in particular, it is necessary to recognize the fact that finances are
the engine of the terrorist train. However, in taking proactive steps
against terror financing, governments must recognize and balance
an equally imperative consideration- the freedom of religion.
As the following discussion will illuminate, terrorists have
discovered various methods of using the financial markets to fund
their activities. For instance, they use the investment realm, the
banking systems, and particularly the informal value transfer
system of hawalas.3 The U.S. government must react by eliminating
the unscrupulous use of these systems, which are modern day
2 Unscrupulous investors are defined as individuals using the financial
markets and systems for purposes of money laundering and terror financing.
3 Hawalas are defined as informal banking networks prevalent in Middle
Eastern culture.
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versions of money laundering. In addressing money laundering
and terrorism financing, it is necessary first to establish the base
understanding of what tools for fighting terrorism financing were
in the government's arsenal before September 11, 2001.
In short, the goal of this Article will be first to show one of the
most powerful and dangerous aspects of terrorism-the use of
regular financial markets. From there we will examine the nature
of the laws prior to the 9/11 attacks to determine whether
approaching terrorism financing in the same way as traditional
money laundering was a proper venture.
Ultimately, the
discussion below, as well as the 9/11 attacks themselves, will show
that such treatment was not, in fact, sufficient. Lastly, the
conclusion of this Article will undertake the task necessary in any
counterterrorism discussion-the act of balancing competing
interests. Specifically, the government has an interest in protecting
its citizenry. A potentially competing interest is the interest in
individuals' freedoms, particularly the right to freely exercise
religion. Weighing back in favor of the government's interest,
then, is the fact that many unscrupulous uses of financial networks
occur under a false pretense of religious exercise.
Throughout this morass of interests, the concluding
recommendations highlight that the answers are neither purely
governmental nor individual. Rather, the government and the
people must each take up their own responsibilities to effectuate an
end to the abuse of financial markets in the name of terrorism
financing.
2.

WHAT IS TERRORISM FINANCING?

2.1. Money Laundering Defined
Money laundering is the "process by which one conceals the
existence, illegal source, or illegal application of income, and then
disguises that income to make it appear legitimate." 4 This
"cleansing" of money has long been a mainstay of criminal activity
in the United States as the cleansing facilitates hiding criminally
derived proceeds.
The traditional method of laundering money requires the

4 PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON ORGANIZED CRIME, INTERIM REPORT TO THE
PRESIDENT AND THE ATFORNEY GENERAL, THE CASH CONNECTION: ORGANIZED CRIME,

FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, AND MONEY LAUNDERING 7 (1984).

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014

U. Pa. J. In t'l. L.

[Vol. 29:1

successful completion of three steps: (1) the launderer must place
the "dirty" money into a legitimate enterprise; (2) these monies are
layered through multiple and separate transactions so as to
obscure the origins of the money; and (3) the now "clean" money is
brought into the legitimate financial community through bank
This
notes, loans, or other market-based instrumentalities. 5
and
important
more
all
the
becomes
discussion, however,
dangerous- when taken beyond the domestic criminal context and
into the international world of financing terrorism.
The discussion of money laundering and the governmental
reaction thereto is important to this Article, where we seek to
identify both the successes and failures of curbing terror financing.
This preliminary discussion of money laundering is important
because prior to 9/11, anti-money laundering legislation
represented the sole weapon to stop terrorism financing, a set of
laws that the attacks of 9/11 showed to be inadequate. Thus, the
examination of anti-money laundering legislation included below
will show that the preexisting legislative mindset equating terrorist
financers with money launderers is improper and in need of
further revamping.
2.2. Informal Value Transfer Systems as a Method of Money
Laundering
Money laundering in the terror financing context is most
commonly implemented through the transnational transferring of
money and property. Specifically, the use of Informal Value
Transfer Systems ("IVTS") 6 is commonly referred to as
"underground banking" because, although operating akin to a
banking system, the IVTS does so without participating in the
formal requirements of institutional banking. 7 However, calling
such networks "underground banks" does not accurately portray
the operation of an IVTS. The IVTS is primarily a system for the
transfer of money and assets rather than an actual provider of full

5 See Teresa A. Adams, Tacking on Money Laundering Charges to White Collar
Crimes: What Did Congress Intend, and What Are the Courts Doing?, 17 GA. ST. U. L.
REV. 531, 535-38 (2000) (describing the three basic stages of money laundering).
6 One example of an IVTS at issue for this discussion is the system of money
transfer through hawalas.
7 See Walter Perkel, Money Laundering and Terrorism: Informal Value Transfer
Systems, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 183, 183-84 (2004) (describing the IVTS and noting
that they "exist outside of the modem banking system .... ).
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banking services. 8 These networks are commonly used in terror
financing for their ability to move funds around the world without
the actual movement of a single traceable dollar. 9
Adding to the complexity of finding improper uses of IVTS
networks, these networks are oftentimes operated openly and
legally, as there is no illegality involved in solely transferring
value. Making these networks even harder to locate and monitor,
most IVTS agents operate numerous legitimate business
ventures.' 0 Creating another layer in this discussion of how the
government ought to respond to abuses of the IVTS system
without infringing on the protected freedom of religious exercise,
in many nations such networks are the sole means of value transfer
often used out of religious duty."
Specifically, an IVTS operates not by exchanging money, which
would be traceable, but rather through the exchanging of debts,
where the only tracking method is a balance sheet.' 2 In transacting
these debt transfers, an IVTS agent will often use untraceable
actions like false pricing on imports or exports, in-kind payments,
13
trade diversion schemes, or the use of pre-paid phone cards.
2.3. Government Responses to Money Laundering
A preliminary discussion of the government's response to
money laundering in the 1980s sets the proper background for the
discussion to follow. This initial discussion will show where the
law stood leading up to 9/11, thereby allowing for a more
thorough analysis of the legislative successes and failures later in
this Article.
The pervasiveness of money laundering in the United States

8 Id.

9 See Christopher Cooper & Ian Johnson, Ongoing Concerns: Money Network
Tied to Terrorism Survives Assault, WALL ST. J., Apr. 22, 2002, at Al (describing
hawalas as networks that "move[ ] money on the basis of personal connections and
promises to pay, not by an actual transfer of money through banks.").
10 Oftentimes, the IVTS agent also works in the areas of travel services and
used cars. However, some IVTS agents sell illicit drugs and stolen goods.
11 See infra Section 3.3.1 (describing hawalas).
12 See Cooper & Johnson, supra note 9 (describing the operation of an IVTS).
13 U.S. DEPT OF TREASURY, A REPORT TO THE CONGRESS IN ACCORDANCE WITH
SECTION 359 OF THE UNITING AND STRENGTHENING AMERICA BY PROVIDING
APPROPRIATE TOOLS REQUIRED TO INTERCEPT AND OBSTRUCT TERRORISM ACT OF 2001

(USA PATRIOT ACT) 19-26
hawalarptfinal11222002.pdf.
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during the 1980s brought about the Money Laundering Control
4
Act of 1986 ("Act," "1986 Act," or "Money Laundering Act").'
The Act was intended to establish liability for an individual who
conducts a financial transaction with knowledge that the funds'
origins are either illegal or illicit.'5 Specifically, the 1986 Act set out
to bar all "monetary transaction[s] in criminally derived property"
in excess of $10,000.16 This Act represented the government's
initial action aimed at the money launderer specifically, as prior
governmental enactments focused on the movement of illicit
monies by financial institutions and often overlooked the
17
individual altogether.
The 1986 Act also served to specifically define what acts would
constitute money laundering. Specifically, the legislation includes
previously used definitions of income from legislative acts that
responded to organized crime, including prostitution, gambling,
drug trafficking, and violations of the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act. 18 The 1986 Act further broadens the
definition of money laundering to include proceeds from copyright
infringement, espionage, trading with the enemy, and violations of
the Internal Revenue Code. 19
For the discussion of terror financing, the 1986 Act offers an
initial lesson showing that definitions must be broad so as to
impact all actors. Further, the 1986 Act provides another important
example for this discussion as it not only bans the specific criminal
act of laundering money, but it has much greater impact by (1)

14 Money Laundering Control Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956-57 (2000).

Id.
Id. § 1957(a). According to 18 U.S.C § 1957(f)(1), a monetary transaction is
"the deposit, withdrawal, transfer, or exchange, in or affecting interstate or
foreign commerce, of funds or a monetary instrument . . . by, through, or to a
financial institution . . . 'but does not include' any transaction necessary to
preserve a person's right to representation as guaranteed by the sixth amendment
to the Constitution."
17 See Mark R. Irvine & Daniel R. King, The Money Laundering Control Act of
1986: Tainted Money and the Criminal Defense Lawyer, 19 PAC. L.J. 171, 176-77 (1987)
(noting the absence of explicit references to individuals in the prior regulations).
18 Andres Rueda, International Money Laundering Law Enforcement & the USA
PATRIOT ACT of 2001, 10 MICH. ST. U. DETROIT C.L. J. INT'L L. 141, 147-49 (2001)
(describing the reach of the 1986 Act); see also 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (2000) (defining
racketeering activities).
19 Rebecca Guinn & Bruce Malloy, Outline of United States Money Laundering
and Related Criminal Statutes, in GAMING ENFORCEMENT E-77 (Robert E. Hauberg, Jr.
ed. 1997).
15
16
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making illegal any use of such funds (2) in perpetuity, without a
20
statute of limitations.
After the 1986 Act, but before the 9/11 attacks morphed the
money laundering issue into a terror financing issue, enforcement
mechanisms against money laundering were found in 18 U.S.C. §§
1956-57. However, despite the success of this legislation against
money laundering, these sections raise concerns for the fight
against terrorism financing in a post-9/11 world.
Section 1956(a)(1) was enacted to focus on the transactional
aspect 21 of money laundering, where the statute only applies if the
transaction specifically handles monies received from illegal
ventures. 22 Thus, although this statute may be effective in the
campaign against typical crime-related money laundering as such
money is usually derived from the sale of drugs, prostitution, or
gambling, 23 it raises concerns for fighting terror financing.
Specifically, this provision is inadequate in stopping terror
financing as it often involves an individual independently giving
his personal funds (which are fully legal monies) to another person
who may eventually fund terrorism.24
In this type of terror financing transaction, where legal monies
move between parties, § 1956(a)(1) would never become active
because the money being moved is legal, or "clean," at the time of
the transaction. Thus, § 1956(a)(1) illuminates another lesson for
the discussion of eliminating terrorism financing. Specifically, the
U.S. government must more proactively investigate the changing
of funds for an illicit intent, as the transfer of any monies, whether
or not they are technically "clean" at that time, ought to be
18 U.S.C. § 1957(f).
The legislation focused intently on the transaction that created the money
in the first place, rather than on the people involved in the money laundering
action itself.
22 See 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1) (stating that "[w]hoever, knowing that the
property involved in a financial transaction represents the proceeds of some form
of unlawful activity, conducts or attempts to conduct such a financial transaction
which in fact involves the proceeds of specified unlawful activity..." may be
subject to specified penalties).
23 Robert W. Helm & Frederick B. Lohr, Creating, Managing and Distributing
Offshore Investment Products: A Legal Perspective, PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, 1412
PLI/CoRP 471,661 (2004).
24 Ross Q. Panko, Banking on the USA PATRIOT Act: An Endorsement of the
Act's Use of Banks to Combat Terrorist Financing and a Response To Its Critics, 122
BANKING L.J. 99, 103 (2005) (detailing seemingly legal means of distributing funds
for terrorist projects).
20

21
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considered "dirty" at the moment there is an intent to support
terrorism.
The 1986 Act then specifically addresses the "transfer" of funds
under § 1956(a)(2). Under 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(2), the act of
transferring illicit money in or out of the United States is illegal.
This section of the statute is a more powerful weapon than §
1956(a)(1), as § 1956(a)(2) does not require the showing that the
monies be direct "proceeds" of an illegal action. 25 However,
despite this more powerful weapon against money laundering, §
1956(a)(2) still illuminates lessons for future terror financing
legislation because (1) § 1956(a)(2) still requires a "transfer," and
there are questions of whether a "transfer" is found in value
transfer systems where no actual money moves, 26 and (2) §
25

18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(2) reads as follows:

(2) Whoever transports, transmits, or transfers, or attempts to transport,
transmit, or transfer a monetary instrument or funds from a place in the
United States to or through a place outside the United States or to a place
in the United States from or through a place outside the United States (A) with the intent to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful
activity; or
(B) knowing that the monetary instrument or funds involved in the
transportation, transmission, or transfer represent the proceeds of
some form of unlawful activity and knowing that such
transportation, transmission, or transfer is designed in whole or in
part(i) to conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source, the
ownership, or the control of the proceeds of specified unlawful
activity; or
(ii) to avoid a transaction reporting requirement under State or
Federal law,
shall be sentenced to a fine of not more than $500,000 or twice the value
of the monetary instrument or funds involved in the transportation,
transmission, or transfer whichever is greater, or imprisonment for not
more than twenty years, or both. For the purpose of the offense
described in subparagraph (B), the defendant's knowledge may be
established by proof that a law enforcement officer represented the
matter specified in subparagraph (B) as true, and the defendant's
subsequent statements or actions indicate that the defendant believed
such representations to be true.
26 See United States v. Dinero Express, Inc., 313 F.3d 803, 806 (2d Cir. 2002)
(stating that "a person is sensibly considered to have engaged in a 'transfer' of
money whenever he accepts money in one location and, pursuant to an overall
course of conduct, causes the delivery of related money to another location");
United States v. Gilboe, 684 F.2d 235, 238 (2d Cir. 1982) (ruling that 18 U.S.C. §
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1956(a)(2) has a provision mandating that the money cross the
border of the United States. 27 The implication here is that §
1956(a)(2) does not become active if the funds move only within
the United States, or if they move only outside of the United States.
Requiring money to cross the American border before
jurisdiction is effectuated raises concerns in fighting terror
financing as financiers can effectively avoid § 1956 by moving
"legal" money domestically or internationally. As such, the
recommendations at the conclusion of this Article mandate that the
United States gains jurisdiction over any money transfer aimed at
the furtherance of terrorism.
Beyond § 1956, the other principle legislative response to
money laundering is 18 U.S.C. § 1957, which specifically applies to
money having derived out of criminal property, rather than
criminal activity.28 Although in many cases the line between
"criminal property" and "criminal activity" appears blurred, the §
1957 provision aims at money laundering that uses the value of
property previously acquired from criminal activity. But, as that
property may not have been directly derived from the criminal
activity, or if the authorities cannot prove the specific activity itself,
§ 1957 offers an alternate method of prosecution. Thus, so long as
the money (1) was derived from criminal property 29 or (2) was
actually the "proceeds" of that criminal activity, then the
government can use § 1956 or § 1957 in response. However, if the
transaction is less than $10,000, then neither statute applies. Thus,
under §§ 1956 and 1957, many individuals would be able to
successfully move money which is technically "clean," in sums of
$9,999 without ever being subjected to § 1956 or § 1957. In light of
the concerns raised by these legislative enactments, the
recommendations discussed later will address the fact that the

2314 covers electronic transfers of funds in addition to paper transfers because the
two methods are functionally indistinct-in both kinds of transactions "the
beginning of the transaction is money in one account and the ending is money in
another").
27 See United States v. Kramer, 73 F.3d 1067, 1072-73 (11th Cir. 1996) (holding
that a defendant was unable to be prosecuted under § 1956(a)(2) when he only
transferred funds within the United States).
28 18 U.S.C. § 1957(a) also requires the transaction to involve monies in excess
of $10,000.
29 18 U.S.C. § 1957(f)(2) defines "criminally derived property" as "any
property constituting, or derived from, proceeds obtained from a criminal
offense."

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014

U. Pa. J. Int'l. L.

[Vol. 29:1

narrow focus of both of these statutes left them open to easy abuses
by terror financiers.
2.4. Elements of Money Laundering Offense
According to the 1986 Act, the U.S. government, in prosecuting
an individual under the 1986 Money Laundering Act, must satisfy
four elements of the crime: (1) knowledge, (2) the existence of
proceeds derived from a specified unlawful activity, (3) the
existence of a financial transaction, and (4) intent to launder
30
money.
2.4.1.

Knowledge

Although the Money Laundering Act requires some form of
knowledge, the specific type of knowledge varies by specific
offense. In general, the government must show knowledge that
there was some sort of unlawful underlying transaction that led to
the money at issue, while some circumstances require the more
specific knowledge of the exact unlawful activity. 31 Of particular
importance in establishing new rules for terror financing, the
32
question of willful blindness was left unanswered.
As discussed above, both §§ 1956 and 1957 require that a
person prosecuted for money laundering have knowledge of the
money's illicit origins, but not knowledge of the specific illegal
activity that made the money illicit in the first place. For instance,
§ 1957 requires that the defendant "knowingly engages or attempts
to engage in a monetary transaction in criminally derived
property." 33 Here, knowledge can be shown without finding that
the defendant actually designed or participated in the underlying
activity. Many circuits, such as the Sixth and Seventh Circuits,
18 U.S.C. § 1956; see also United States v. Brown, 186 F.3d 661, 667-68 (5th
Cir. 1999) (outlining the elements of a money laundering offense); United States v.
Sayakhom, 186 F.3d 928, 942-43 (9th Cir. 1999) (outlining the elements of money
laundering for mail fraud).
31 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(1) (requiring that the defendant know "the property
involved in the transaction represents proceeds from some form, though not
necessarily which form, of activity that constitutes a felony under State, Federal,
or foreign law, regardless of whether or not such activity is specified in paragraph
(7)").
32 Willful blindness is defined as "the state of mind of one who does not
possess positive knowledge only because he consciously avoided it." United
States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697, 702 (9th Cir. 1976).
33 18 U.S.C. § 1957(a).
30
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have permitted adequate circumstantial evidence to show the
34
requisite level of knowledge.
However, the "knowledge" requirement most important for
this discussion is whether "willful blindness" can stand for
knowledge. 35 Both §§ 1956 and 1957 require "actual knowledge," a
more stringent standard than a negligence theory of "should have
known" or "reckless disregard." 36 In order to reconcile this issue,
courts have taken proactive steps to erode this hard-line rule of
requiring "actual knowledge" by a finding that "knowledge" may
37
be satisfied through willful blindness.
For the topic of curbing terror financing, the problem with the
Money Laundering Act acting as the enforcement mechanism was
that the question of "actual knowledge" and "willful blindness"
was left unanswered. Willful blindness is vitally important to
terror financing as an individual may send his "clean" money to a
person whom he "does not know for sure will use the money for
terrorism," yet knows that the recipient has on multiple previous
occasions funded terrorism. Thus, as terror financing is a more
evasive system than strict money laundering, the open-ended
definitions used in anti-money laundering legislation cannot
double as definitions in terrorism financing legislation.
In
promoting new and effective methods of curbing terror financing,
"willful blindness" must be statutorily held as tantamount to
"actual knowledge."

34 See, e.g., United States v. Prince, 214 F.3d 740, 760 (6th Cir. 2000)
(upholding a jury instruction which stated that the jury "may infer that the
defendant had knowledge from circumstantial evidence or from evidence
showing willful blindness by the defendant.); United States v. Smith, 223 F.3d 554,
577 (7th Cir. 2000) (upholding conviction where "[t]he circumstantial evidence...
could legitimately have been interpreted by the jury to show money
laundering ....).
35 See supra note 32.
36 See Sayakhom, 186 F.3d at 943 n.8 (quoting United States v. Heaps, 29 F.3d
479, 484 (4th Cir. 1994)) (stating that a defendant "may not be convicted on just
what he should have known" but that "both direct and circumstantial evidence
can be used to establish knowledge and are given the same weight.").
37 United States v. Epstein, 426 F.3d 431, 440 (1st Cir. 2005) (quoting United
States v. Coviello, 225 F.3d 54, 70 (1st Cir. 2000)) ("A willful blindness instruction
is appropriate if (1) a defendant claims a lack of knowledge, (2) the facts suggest a
conscious course of deliberate ignorance, and (3) the instruction, taken as a whole,
cannot be misunderstood as mandating an inference of knowledge.") (internal
quotations and citations omitted).

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014

U. Pa. J. Int'l. L.
2.4.2.

[Vol. 29:1

The Existence of Proceeds Derived From a Specified
Unlawful Activity

The second element of a money laundering offense requires
showing an action that involves the "proceeds of specified
unlawful activity." 38 The first part of this requirement is the
definition of the term "proceeds." How tangential can income be
and still be considered "proceeds"? Or, more importantly, how far
back must the government trace money to find the money at issue
to be "proceeds"? However, under § 1956, the term "proceeds" is
not defined, and under § 1957, the statute merely uses "criminally
derived property" to stand for "proceeds."
Thus, for the scope of the term "proceeds," there remains no
agreed upon definition.
As this discussion looks to the
enforcement mechanisms used against money laundering to
identify their strengths and weaknesses when applied to terror
financing, this lack of a definition proves difficult. When the
transaction changes from a money laundering campaign involving
prostitution proceeds into the world of terror financing where the
financial transaction supports terrorism, a statute cannot have an
element of the crime that is left undefined and open for legal
argument and maneuvering.
In addition, another aspect of this requirement pertinent to this
Article is how far back the government must trace money to find
"proceeds." Under § 1956, the government does not necessarily
have to trace the dollar to a particular offense. Rather, the
government is only required to establish a showing that the
defendant participated in actions that are "typical of criminal
activity," and that there was no other legitimate source of the
funds. 39 However, the legal system has been reluctant to permit
such circumstantial showings to stand wholly on their own,
preferring such showings only to allow a jury to make an
inferential finding that there could not have been a legal source of
40
the funds.
18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1).
39 See United States v. Blackman, 904 F.2d 1250, 1257 (8th Cir. 1990)
(upholding conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i), stating that while the
statute does not "require that the government trace the proceeds to a particular
sale" and "the government cannot rely exclusively on proof that a defendant...
has no legitimate source of income," conviction is allowed where "sufficient
circumstantial evidence from which a juror could infer each element of the money
laundering offense beyond a reasonable doubt.").
40 See generally United States v. Monaco, 194 F.3d 381, 387 (2d Cir. 1999)
38
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Thus, the fact that the government need not actually prove the
predicate offense makes this statute an advantageous weapon for
government prosecutions.
Section 1956 further defers to the
government's case as the government is not required to trace the
funds where an individual is shown to have intertwined the illicit
funds with legal income. 41 Thus, as noted above, in order to
sustain its burden, the government need only show that a portion
of the funds in question were more likely than not involved in
42
illegal activity.
Beyond the deference to the government regarding standards
of proof, the topic of commingled funds is also highly deferential
to the government in enforcement as a conviction involving the
commingling of funds will result in the forfeiture of all funds (no
matter which parts are legitimate).4 3 For the purposes of this
Article, it is important that the law used to combat terror financing
specifically define the government's duty in tracing money.
Further, this Section requires those "proceeds" to be of a
"specified unlawful activity."
The 1986 Act itself offers an
expansive list of specific crimes that will satisfy this requirement. 44
While the enunciation of specific underlying crimes may be
sufficient against money laundering, such restrictive language was
inadequate in stopping the terrorist attacks of 9/11. Specifically,
(finding that evidence of a defendant living far above his means was admissible in
a money laundering case and that "the jury was permitted to draw the inference
that their prosperity was attributable to money laundering").
41 See United States v. Ward, 197 F.3d 1076, 1083 (11th Cir. 1999) (holding that
Congress did not intend criminals to be able to escape money laundering
violations by merely commingling funds).
42 This use of § 1956 is of particular importance for the government as a
prosecution under § 1957 is not necessarily successful against commingled funds.
See United States v. Rutgard, 116 F.3d 1270, 1291-93 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that §
1957 requires tracing or proof that, following transfer, account balance dropped
below amount of criminal proceeds deposited in commingled account because
statute does not expressly cover funds "involved" in transactions).
43 See United States v. Tencer, 107 F.3d 1120, 1134-35 (5th Cir. 1997)
(concluding after examining the legislative history of 18 U.S.C. § 981 that all
commingled funds in account were subject to forfeiture under § 982(a)(1), as
"property involved" includes any property used to facilitate the money
laundering offense).
44 See 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7) (enumerating specified unlawful activities
including murder, kidnapping, robbery, fraud, extortion, narcotics distribution,
and others). The Second Circuit contributed to this discussion by noting that "[slo
long as the cash is represented to have come from any of these activities, a
defendant is guilty of the substantive offense of money laundering." United
States v. Stavroulakis, 952 F.2d 686, 691 (2d Cir. 1992).
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money laundering focuses on the "cleansing" of illegal monies,
and thus creating a list of underlying offenses will permit effective
prosecution. However, in terror financing there is often no illegal
underlying offense, but rather a future intent to use the funds
illegally. Thus, a requirement that the money have a specific origin
is unnecessarily restrictive in fighting terror financing.
2.4.3.

FinancialTransaction

The third requirement for finding a money laundering offense
is the existence of a "financial transaction." Contrary to common
understanding, a "financial transaction" is not limited to merely
banking or investment-house transactions. Rather, the statute's
use of the term "financial institution" creates liability for any
exchange of money between two parties, 45 so long as the
transaction in some way impacts interstate commerce and meets
one of the four intent requirements found in § 1956(a)(3). 46
Specifically, to be a violation under § 1956, the activities must
impact interstate commerce or involve a "financial institution
which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or
foreign commerce in any way or degree." 47 This requirement is
not as important for the actual classification of an action as
constituting money laundering per se, rather the standard exists so
as to effectuate federal jurisdiction. However, such a standard is
easy to meet as courts are often lenient in finding an impact on
interstate commerce, permitting such a finding with only minimal
effects. Thus, in seeking principles from money laundering
legislation to apply to terror financing legislation, this requirement
does not raise substantial issues for terror financing.
2.4.4.

Intent

The fourth legislative requirement for money laundering is
"intent." The methods for showing intent under § 1956 are finding
the (A) (i) intent to promote a specified unlawful activity, or (ii)
intent to engage in a violation of the Internal Revenue Code, (B)
45

See G. Richard Strafer, Money Laundering: The Crime of the '90's, 27 AM.

CRIM. L. REV. 149, 193 (1989) (citing 18 U.S.C. §1956(c)(4)) ("The definition of the

term ['financial transaction'] is not limited to banking or other financial
institutions.").
46 See infra Section 2.4.4 (explaining the four intent requirements of the
Money Laundering Act).
47 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(4).
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knowing that the transaction is designed in whole or in part (i) to
conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source, the
ownership, or the control of the proceeds of specified unlawful
activity, or (ii) to avoid a transaction reporting requirement under
State or Federal law. 48 Alternatively, a § 1957 prosecution only
requires a showing of knowledge that the financial transaction is
occurring, without specifically requiring the intent to launder
money, making § 1957 a more advantageous weapon for
49
prosecution.
Showing "intent," much like showing knowledge, requires a
fact-specific analysis. The intent requirements under the 1986 Act
demand that a defendant acts knowing that the transaction, or
movement of property, is designed to hide information about the
proceeds of the specified criminal activity. 50 As referenced earlier,
the intent for terror financing must be broad enough to include any
financial act intended to further terrorism. But, throughout this
discussion, the question remains: how does this area of antimoney laundering tie to terror financing and the modem day "war
on terrorism"?

48 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(A)-(B).
49
50

18 U.S.C. § 1957(a).
The act reads:

(3) Whoever, with the intent (A) to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful activity;
(B) to conceal or disguise the nature, location, source, ownership, or
control of property believed to be the proceeds of specified unlawful
activity; or
(C) to avoid a transaction reporting requirement under State or
Federal law,
conducts or attempts to conduct a financial transaction involving
property represented to be the proceeds of specified unlawful activity, or
property used to conduct or facilitate specified unlawful activity, shall be
fined under this title or imprisoned for not more than 20 years, or both.
For purposes of this paragraph and paragraph (2), the term
"represented" means any representation made by a law enforcement
officer or by another person at the direction of, or with the approval of, a
Federal official authorized to investigate or prosecute violations of this
section.
18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(3).
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TERROR FINANCING AND 9/11 SPECIFICALLY

The legal and political impact of the 9/11 attacks altered not
only national security and international law, but rather the attacks
changed all law. 51 The specific alteration at issue in this discussion
is the legal and policy implications on financial transactions after
9/11. Historically, the use of IVTS networks has been tied to
kidnapping, tax evasion, corruption, and weapons smuggling.5 2
More important to this immediate discussion, however, al-Qaeda
used IVTS networks to provide funds to terrorists before 9/11.53
Before engaging in the discussion of terror financing
specifically, it must be highlighted that terrorism is fully
dependent on money and financiers. As such, finances are the
engine to the terrorist train. Efforts to change, or "win," the hearts
and minds of terrorists are important, but pose limited likelihood
of success on their own.54
Rather, it is a more powerful
counterterrorism weapon to cut off the lifeblood of these
individuals, making their mindsets a moot point. The specific
"Achilles' heel" that is the source of this discussion is the financing
of terrorism through loose organizations that leave no articulable
trail. In short, the financial networks at issue move value through
many individuals, charities, and investment organizations without
raising a single red flag.
51 See, e.g., Dan Belz, Is InternationalHumanitarianLaw Lapsing Into Irrelevance
in the War on International Terror?, 7 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 97 (2005) (discussing
the changing U.S. approach to humanitarian law in the context of the war on
terror); Stephen P. Marks, Branding the "War on Terrorism": Is There a "New
Paradigm" of International Law?, 14 MICH. ST. J.INT'L L. 71 (2006) (discussing the
state of international law after 9/11); Sheela Murthy & Carla O'Donoghue, Impact
of Natural Disasters on Immigration and Business, MD.B.J., July-Aug. 2006, at 38, 38
(stating that "[a]fter the horrific attacks of September 11, 2001, the landscape of
immigration law changed forever"); Stephen P. Watters & Joseph S. Lawder, The
Impact of September 11th on Tort Law and Insurance, 29 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 809
(2003) (detailing the drastic effects of 9/11 in the area of tort law and insurance).
52 See PATRICK M. JOST & HARJIT SINGH SANDHU, THE HAWALA ALTERNATIVE
REMITrANCE SYSTEM AND ITS ROLE IN MONEY LAUNDERING 19-21 (2000), available at
http://www.interpol.int/Public/FinancialCrime/MoneyLaundering/hawala/
default.asp (describing cases where hawala techniques have been used to launder
money).
53 See generally NAT'L COMM'N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11
COMMISSION REPORT ch. 2 (2004), available at http://www.9-llcommission.gov/
report/911Report.pdf [hereinafter 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT] (recounting the rise
and growth of the al-Qaeda before 9/11).
54 James Dao, Trying to Win Iraqi Hearts and Minds on the Battlefield, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 6, 2003, at B5.
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3.1. How TerroristsFinance Their Missions
Despite many similarities, terror financing presents a wholly
different discussion from money laundering and as such, the
traditional money laundering legislation is insufficient against
terror financing. Money laundering, as the above discussion
suggests, is the cleaning and concealment of "dirty" or "illicit"
money. A governmental program that searches for illegal activities
will likely find money laundering. However, the financial acts in
terror financing do not necessarily involve illicit funds. In money
laundering the criminality begins with the illicit earning of funds,
followed by the subsequent illegal act of money laundering. In
terror financing, however, the actual illegality often occurs only
after the actual transfer, when the money is ultimately used for
funding terrorism. Thus, the mere application of the existing
money laundering rules is insufficient.
In short, the problematic nature of IVTS networks is that it is
practically impossible to track the funds due to the fact that most
dollars passing through an IVTS are legitimate and clean. 55 In the
IVTS networks, clean money is sent through a system populated by
mostly "clean" money, and the funds reach their illegal purpose
when used for terrorism.
3.2. Government Responses to TerrorFinancingBefore and After 9/11
3.2.1.

InternationalOrganizations

The United States has promoted many different agenda points
aimed at curbing money laundering internationally in an effort to
make it less enticing for domestic individuals to use the
international markets to launder money and finance illicit actions.
One such effort was the creation of the Financial Action Task Force
("FATF"), the investigative body of the Organization for Economic
FATF
Cooperation and Development, of the G-8 nations.5 6
55 This means that the money is not derived from illegal acts or in the
furtherance of such intentions. See U.N. Dep't of Econ. & Soc. Aff., Discussion
Paper Series, Informal Money Transfer Systems: Opportunities and Challenges for
Development Finance, U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/2002/DP/26 (Nov. 2002) (prepared by
Leonides Buencamino & Sergei Gorbunov) (stating that between $100 and $300
billion pass through the IVTS each year).
56 See The Administration's NationalMoney Laundering Strategyfor 2002: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 107th Cong. 38-47
(2002) (statement of Kenneth W. Dam, Deputy Secretary, U.S. Dep't of the
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promotes U.S. interests by requiring nations to institute their own
57
domestic legislation in compliance with established regulations.
Beyond tacitly requiring countries to create their own domestic
laws aimed at money laundering, FATF puts forth "special
recommendations" that specifically delineate legislative actions
58
nations are urged to follow.
Special Recommendation VI addresses IVTS networks.
Specifically, it states that countries must "license[] or register[]" all
informal value transfer businesses and subject them to the same
FATF requirements as banks and financial houses. 59
This
"recommendation" has significant implications, as the failure of a
nation to comply can result in the G-8 nations adding the
noncompliant nation to a blacklist of "Non-Cooperating Countries
and Territories" until that nation agrees to comply with such
recommendations.

60

The United States has stepped further into the international
realm by specifically identifying a "hawala triangle" existing
between Dubai, Pakistan, and India, as they are the areas most
heavily invested in hawalas.61
The United States became
particularly interested in this area given that Mohamed Atta and
Marwan Al Shehhi, two of the 9/11 hijackers, received more than
$120,000 from Dubai in 2000.62
Treasury) (discussing the recommendations adopted by the FATF in an effort to
safeguard financial systems from terrorist abuse).
57 G. Scott Dowling, Fatal Broadside: The Demise of Caribbean Offshore Financial
Confidentiality Post USA PATRIOT Act, 17 TRANSNATL LAW. 259,283 (2004).
58 In order to fully understand terrorism, and this discussion in particular, it
is necessary that one recognize the fact that all terrorism is based on money, and
financiers are the engine of the terrorist train. Specifically, the FATF's goal is "to
secure the adoption by all financial centres of international standards to prevent,
detect, and punish money laundering, and thereby effectively co-operate
internationally in the global fight against money laundering." FIN. ACTION TASK
FORCE, ANNUAL REVIEW OF NON-COOPERATIVE COUNTRIES AND TERRITORIES 20052006, at 2 (2006), http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/0/0/37029619.pdf.
59 FIN.

ACTION

TASK

FORCE

ON

RECOMMENDATIONS ON TERRORIST FINANCING

MONEY

LAUNDERING,

SPECIAL

2 (2004), http://www.fatf-gafi.org/

dataoecd/8/17/34849466.pdf.
60 See FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE ON MONEY LAUNDERING, THE FORTY
RECOMMENDATIONS 7 (2003), http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/7/40/
34849567.pdf (authorizing countries to "apply appropriate countermeasures" to
countries that insufficiently comply with the FATF Recommendations).
61 Timothy L. O'Brien, U.S. Focusing on Dubai as a Terrorist Financial Center,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2003, at 13.
62 Judy Pasternak & Stephen Braun, Emirates Looked Other Way While Al Qaeda
Funds Flowed, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2002, at Al.
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Responding to the U.S. scrutiny of the "hawala triangle," the
United Arab Emirates took measures in the international
community by participating in a 2002 financial conference with
more than 300 international delegates. 63 At this conference the
Abu Dhabi Declaration on Hawala was adopted. 64 The goal of this
declaration was to articulate and recognize the positive aspects of
hawalas as they "provide[] a fast and cost effective method for
worldwide remittance of money," while also calling for their
effective, but not overly restrictive, regulation. 65 More important,
though, was the declaration that the "international community
should remain seized with the issue and should continue to work
individually and collectively to regulate the Hawala system for
legitimate commerce and to prevent its exploitation or misuse." 66
3.2.2.

Domestic Legislative and OperationalResponses

In order to further ascertain the effective and ineffective ways
of targeting terror financing, the discussion of laws on the books
before the 9/11 attacks must move beyond the money-launderingspecific legislation to a discussion of other efforts aimed at
regulating the illegal use of the IVTS. Specifically, the Bank
Secrecy Act of 1970 ("BSA") was the initial legislation requiring
record-keeping and reporting requirements for banks. 67 Then,
Congress specifically addressed IVTS networks through the
aforementioned Money Laundering Control Act of 1986, which
includes the more often recognized money laundering rules. 68
Third, in attempting to coalesce these standards with
counterterrorism efforts, the United States Congress legislated the
United and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate
Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001
("PATRIOT Act"). 69 The PATRIOT Act is specifically applicable to
63 Rachana Pathak, The Obstacles to Regulating the Hawala:A CulturalNorm or a
TerroristHotbed?, 27 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 2007,2037 (2004).
64 See FIRST INT'L CONFERENCE ON HAWALA, ABU DHABI DECLARATION ON
HAWALA
(2002), available at http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/
programs/ Hawala-conf.pdf.
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 Bank Secrecy Act of 1970, Pub. L. No; 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 12, 18, and 31 U.S.C.).
68 Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 981
(2000)).
69 Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (codified as amended in scattered sections
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this discussion as it makes the failure to comply with the BSA's
reporting requirement a criminal, rather than merely a civil,
offense.
Beyond these legislative responses, the U.S. Department of the
Treasury established an enforcement division called the Financial
Crimes Enforcement Network ("FinCEN") 70 which works with
various U.S. law enforcement agencies in an effort to ensure
compliance with the above legislation. 71 While FinCEN focuses on
domestic enforcement, the international realm is covered by the
Office of Foreign Assets Control, which focuses on disrupting and
freezing illicit funds internationally. 72 The enforcement "teeth"
beyond these legislative regimes and entities exist in the
Department of the Treasury's inter-agency enforcement group,
"Operation Green Quest," 73 which is a "multiagency task force led
by the U.S. Customs Service that also includes the Internal
Revenue Service, the Secret Service, Treasury's Office of Foreign
Asset Control, and FinCEN." 74 This multiagency task force

of 8, 18, 42, and 50 U.S.C.).
70 According to the website for the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network of
the U.S. Department of the Treasury, the mission of this entity is to "safeguard the
financial system from the abuses of financial crime, including terrorist financing,
money laundering, and other illicit activity." Financial Crimes Enforcement
Mission,
FinCEN
Treas.,
About
of
the
Dep't
U.S.
Network,
http://www.fincen.gov/afmission.html (last visited Oct. 19, 2007).
71 Id.
72 According to the website for the Office of Foreign Assets Control of the
U.S. Department of the Treasury, the mission of this entity is to
administer[] and enforce[] economic and trade sanctions based on US
foreign policy and national security goals against targeted foreign
countries, terrorists, international narcotics traffickers, and those
engaged in activities related to the proliferation of weapons of mass
OFAC acts under Presidential wartime and national
destruction.
emergency powers, as well as authority granted by specific legislation, to
impose controls on transactions and freeze foreign assets under US
jurisdiction.
U.S. Treasury - Office of Foreign Assets Control, http://www.treas.gov/offices/
enforcement/ofac/ (last visited Oct. 18, 2007).
73 This entity is comprised of members of the United States Secret Service,
United States Customs, the FBI, the CIA, and the Department of Justice. See
Operation Green Quest Overview, http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/newsroom/
newsreleases/archives/legacy/2002/22002/02262002.xml (last visited Oct. 17,
2007) (listing participating governmental organizations).
74 Joseph Wheatley, Comment, Ancient Banking, Modern Crimes: How Hawala
Secretly Transfers the Finances of Criminals and Thwarts Existing Laws, 26 U. PA. J.
INT'L ECON. L. 347,361-62 (2005).
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operates to "augment existing counter-terrorist efforts by bringing
the full scope of the government's financial expertise to bear
against systems, individuals, and organizations that serve as
sources of terrorist funding." 75
Beyond the aforementioned governmental responses, there
have also been significant statutory efforts to curb terror financing.
However, although the federal government has pursued
substantial efforts regarding terror financing, they simply need to
go further. The most direct and effective measures on point are the
material support statutes. 76 Despite the value they serve in
prohibiting material support, they are insufficient because of two
shortcomings.
First, sections 2339A and 2339B both make it unlawful to
knowingly or intentionally provide resources to terrorists or terror
organizations. 77 However, as discussed throughout this Article,
the "knowledge" requirement leaves an impermissible door open
whereby an individual insulates himself from culpability by acting
in a "willfully ignorant" manner. Thus, to cure this deficiency, the
statute must apply to providing any material support.
Second, these statutes necessitate the transfer specifically to a
terror organization. However, such an element is extraordinarily
difficult to show. The statute must be expanded to outlaw material
support while clearly delineating specifically what is required for
showing the connection of support.
In short, it is essential that, on the one hand, the rule of law not
be excessive or extreme; but on the other hand, the rule of law
cannot allow for such loopholes where one may claim innocence
based on either willful ignorance or a difficulty in showing the
intricate linkage of funds to a specific, amorphous terrorist entity.

75 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Office of Public Affairs, Deputy
Secretary Dam Remarks at the Launch of Operation Green Quest (Oct. 25, 2001),
availableat http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/po727.htm.
76 See 18 U.S.C. § 2339A (Supp. IV 2004) (criminalizing the concealment or
protection of terrorists); 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (Supp. IV 2004) (allowing prosecution
of such crimes in any federal judicial district in which the underlying offense was
committed).
77 See 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(a) ("Whoever, within the United States, provides
material support or resources ... knowing or intending that they are to be used in
preparation for . . . [a terrorist act] . . . shall be fined under this title .... "); 18
U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1) ("Whoever, within the United States or subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States, knowingly provides material support ... to a
foreign terrorist organization... shall be fined under this title .... ).
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3.3. Government Action Towards Hawalas
3.3.1.

How Hawalas Work

Hawalas are an often-discussed and criticized source of terror
financing. 78 The IVTS system is popular because of its low fees
and lack of formalities. However, the lack of formalities raises the
danger that they will be used for illicit purposes, since there is
oftentimes not a paper-trail of a transaction, the money does not
cross the American border, and the money is legal, or "clean," at
the time of the transfer. 79 This is dangerous considering, for
instance, that the primary focus of legislative efforts to curb money
laundering and terror financing before 9/11 was on (1) the illegal
nature of the money in question and (2) the need for such money to
cross the border. Neither of these two triggers is "activated" in the
hawala example below. As a primary method of IVTS, the hawala is
used around the world to transfer money or assets without either a
paper trail or the high fees charged by banks. In order to
understand how an IVTS system is used to finance terrorism, it is
imperative to see how such a transaction occurs and to see the
complete lack of formalities or paper trails.
The following
illustration will describe how such value transfer systems work:
An American citizen ("AC") wants to send $1,000 to his friend
("F") in Turkey. AC contacts a hawaladar ("HI") in the United
States to effectuate this transfer. 80 H1 consents to make this value
transfer from AC to F for a 2% fee, an amount less than charged at
banks or wire transfer businesses. AC then pays H1 $1,000 and H1
gives AC a password. After this, AC contacts F to give him the
password and tells F whom to contact in Turkey to receive the
money. At the same time, H1 contacts his business partner, a
hawaladarin Turkey ("H2"). H1 informs H2 of the transaction and
H2 gives the same password H1 gave AC. When F meets H2 and
gives H2 the password, F receives the local equivalent of $1,000
minus the 2% commission. At no point did an actual dollar move
between countries in this transaction.
78 However, hawalas are only one source of such fund transfers.
Other
regional names, like fei ch'ien, phoe kuan, and chop shop are used.
79 See Adil Anwar Daudi, The Invisible Bank: Regulating the Hawala System in
India, Pakistan and the United Arab Emirates, 15 IND. INT'L & COMP.L. REv. 619, 632
(2005) (describing hawalas' potential for illegal activity).
80 In all probability, H1 operates this money transfer business on the side of
his main business, the operation of a convenience store, for instance.
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However, this is only half of the transaction. While AC and F
have completed their transaction, H1 received $1,000 and H2 paid
the local equivalent of $1,000 minus the commission fee. Thus,
there is a debt of roughly $1,000 between hawaladars. One way to
repay such debts is through reverse transactions where a person in
Turkey wishes to send $1,000 to a person in the United States and
opts to use H2 and H1 for such a transaction. However, another
commonly used method between hawaladars is through legitimate
business. When the hawaladars are involved in importing and
exporting, for example, the $1,000 debt can be repaid by adjusting
an invoice to overstate the value of the legitimate goods by $1,000.
Or, alternatively, H2 may owe $1,000 to another hawaladar in
America, and in order to satisfy the debt incurred in the
transaction described above, H1 may pay H2's debt to the third
party.
This brief picture of the hawala system shows how the
achievement of a simple goal8 l requires a complicated set of
transactions.
This picture also highlights how hawalas work
without any physical transfer of money between primary parties
and is based fully on trust and obligations rather than paperwork,
making regulation and tracking very difficult.
The nature of the hawala system, and its potential for abuse,
require law enforcement to address regulation of the system.
Although it is nearly impossible to gauge the size of hawalas
worldwide, it is estimated that hawalas involve billions of dollars
traveling around the world through these informal, unregistered
82
networks.

81 The goal is transferring money without subjecting the transactions to
banking or regulatory fees.
82 See generally Dilip Ratha, Workers' Remittances: An Important and Stable
Source of External Development Finance, in GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT FINANCE, STRIVING
FOR STABILITY IN DEVELOPMENT FINANCE 157 (2003), reprinted in REMITTANCES
DEVELOPMENT IMPACT AND FUTURE PROSPECTS 19 (Samuel Munzele Maimbo &
Dilip Ratha eds., 2005) (examining the role of workers' remittances as a source of
external financing for developing countries); Hawala and Underground Terrorist
Financing Mechanisms: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Int'l Trade and Fin. of the S.
Comm. On Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 107th Cong. 22 (2001) (statement of
Rahim Bariek, Bariek Money Transfer) (discussing the transactions within a
specific hawala);MOHAMMED EL QORCHI ET AL., INT'L MONETARY FUND, OCCASIONAL
PAPER No. 222, INFORMAL FUNDS TRANSFER SYSTEMS: AN ANALYSIS OF THE INFORMAL
HAWALA SYSTEM (2003) (discussing the operation, benefits, and risks of the hawala
system and the challenges of regulating these complex, informal fund transfer
systems).
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General Government Reactions to IVTS Networks

Under the aforementioned legislative framework of money
laundering statutes and the PATRIOT Act,83 the U.S. government
aims to regulate illegal money transfers through IVTS. Specifically,
the PATRIOT Act acts as a way to patch many of the previously
discussed holes through which terror financiers have slipped.
Under the PATRIOT Act, all individuals or entities that transfer
monies, no matter how formal or informal, must comply with the
aforementioned money laundering regulations. 84 Of the most
importance to this discussion, the PATRIOT Act redefines "money
transmitting business" to include any person "who engages as a
business in the transmission of funds, including any person who
engages as a business through an informal money transfer system
or any network of people who engage as a business in facilitating
the transfer of money domestically or internationally outside of the
conventional financial institutions system."8 5 The importance of
this definitional change lies in that the strict reporting rules
previously applicable only to banks now apply to these informal
transfer entities.
Under the BSA, the term of art used for these non-bank transfer
entities is "money-transmitters" or "money service businesses"
(MSBs). 86 The PATRIOT Act applies the financial rules to IVTS
networks by making it illegal to run an MSB (a) without the
applicable state license, (b) outside of FinCEN's requirements for
registration, or (c) with knowledge that the money had an illegal
origin.8 7 The origins of the PATRIOT Act defined "unlicensed
money transmitting business" as any "money transmitting
business which affects interstate or foreign commerce in any
manner or degree and (A) is operated without an appropriate
money transmitting license ...(B) fails to comply with the money
transmitting business registration requirements . . . or (C)
otherwise involves the transportation or transmission of funds that
See Section 3.3.2, infra.
Shawn Turner, U.S. Anti-Money Laundering Regulations: An Economic
Approach to Cyberlaundering, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1389, 1411 (2004) ("[T]he
Patriot Act expands the BSA's scope to include informal value transfer
systems.... In particular, section 359(a) of the Patriot Act brings 'informal money
transfer systems' under the BSA's reporting requirements.").
85 31 U.S.C. § 5330(d)(1)(A) (Supp. IV 2004).
86 U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, supra note 13, at 7.
87 18 U.S.C.A. § 1960(b)(1)(A)-(C) (West 2006).
83
84
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are . . . intended to be used to promote or support unlawful
88
activity."
The PATRIOT Act strengthened the financial enforcement
system by requiring every MSB to register like a corporation,
providing contact names and numbers which must include an
owner's name, his contact address, the MSB's financial account
numbers, and a number given it by the federal government. 89 This
is important to the discussion at hand because, as noted earlier, the
lack of formalities in IVTS transfers is the primary reason for the
ease with which they are abused.
Imposing reporting
requirements similar to those applied to banks was an attempt to
eliminate loopholes.
Like a bank, an MSB must verify the identity of any customer
or beneficiary receiving a money transfer of more than $3,000.90
Further, MSBs must also comply with the Suspicious Activity
Reporting Requirements. 91
3.3.3.

How Are These Statutes To Be Applied?

Legislative responses to terror financing and money
laundering, as discussed earlier, are often only applied to actions
occurring within the United States. However, application of such
efforts to curb terrorism's financing must have international
application.
In United States v. Davis,92 the Ninth Circuit outlined a three
stage inquiry for when a statute should have international
application: (a) whether Congress had the authority to establish
extraterritorial effect to the statute, (b) whether Congress
Id.
See 31 U.S.C. § 5330 (2000) (discussing registration requirement for money
transmitting businesses).
90 Amendment
to the Bank Secrecy Act Regulations Relating to
Recordkeeping for Funds Transfers and Transmittals of Funds by Financial
Institutions, 60 Fed. Reg. 220, 229-31 (1995) (changing the reporting requirements
for transfers of $3,000 or more).
91 31 C.F.R. § 103.20(a)(1) ("Every money services business.., shall file with
the Treasury Department ... a report of any suspicious transaction relevant to a
possible violation of law or regulation.").
92 905 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1990) (affirming the California Court of Appeal's
decision finding no due process violation in the prosecution of the vessel captain
under the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act when his foreign registry vessel
was seized 100 miles off the coast of the United States and holding that the Fourth
Amendment protections did not extend to the search of foreign registry vessels at
88

89

sea).
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specifically intended the statute to apply extraterritorially, and (c)
whether the Due Process Clause permits the United States to
93
punish such conduct as is outlawed by the statute in question.
Applying this three-part test, the Ninth Circuit articulated
narrowing factors, the most important of which was the
requirement that "there be a sufficient nexus between the
defendant and the United States so that such application would not
be arbitrary ... "94
Applying the Davis test to the previously discussed legislative
framework, the statutes prohibiting and prosecuting money
laundering meet the Davis three-part test. Specifically, under the
Foreign Commerce Clause, the United States government may
regulate business activities in the United States that involve other
nations, 95 the statutes can be read under a plain meaning analysis
to see that Congress intended extraterritorial application, 96 and the
Due Process Clause has never been held to prohibit the United
States government from prosecuting money laundering or terror
financing. Further, any attempts to promote terrorism provide a
sufficient nexus to the United States, satisfying the above tests.
This principle is not limited to the Ninth Circuit, as the
Eleventh Circuit has added its input in the case of United States v.
Tarkoff.97 In Tarkoff, a transaction between citizens of Israel and
Curacao was considered within the jurisdiction of § 1956 as the
individuals had traveled throughout Israel, used international
phone calls to communicate, and moved funds through an
international bank. 98 Thus, each of these holdings shows that the
"nexus to the U.S." requirement is not a strenuous one to satisfy,
allowing the U.S. Congress to enact legislation targeting terror
financing around the world.

Id. at 248-49.
Id. (noting that such test would be met "'[w]here an attempted transaction
(citing United
is aimed at causing criminal acts within the United States .....
States v. Peterson, 812 F.2d 486, 493 (9th Cir. 1987)).
95 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 ("regulate Commerce with foreign Nations .....
96 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956-57 (2000) (articulating jurisdiction over foreign
institutions).
97 242 F.3d 991 (11th Cir. 2001) (upholding money laundering and conspiracy
conviction based on transactions occurring wholly outside United States).
98 Id. at 994-95.
93
94
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3.3.4.

Case Studies of PATRIOT Act Prosecution

The first PATRIOT Act case study of government action against
an MSB involved Mohamed Hussein. 99 Hussein ran an MSB
without having complied with the licensing requirements and was
sentenced to eighteen months in jail. 100 This case highlights an
important precedent because Hussein argued a "lack of
knowledge" defense, which the court held to not be viable.101 This
holding is important to the fight against terrorism financing, as
denying an argument of "lack of knowledge" will preclude an
investor from being "willfully blind" about the destination of his
funds.
In a second case, al-Barakaat was subject to a PATRIOT Act
investigation. Al-Barakaat was a financial entity based in Somalia
operating throughout Europe and North America. Further, alBarakaat was the largest employer in all of Somalia. 102 In addition
to being known as the largest employer in Somalia, al-Barakaat
was also believed to have funneled a maximum of $20 million to
al-Qaeda every year.103 Acting on such information, as well as a
belief that al-Barakaat's founder was Ahmed Nur Ali Jimale, a
close associate of al-Qaeda, federal agents of the United States
carried out raids against four different al-Barakaat store-front
operations within the United States. 04
99 See Alicia L. Rause, USA Patriot Act: Anti-Money Laundering and Terrorist
FinancingLegislation in the U.S. and Europe Since September 11th, 11 U. MIAMI INT'L &
CoMP. L. REV. 173, 176-77 (2003) (discussing cases that have been or are currently
being prosecuted under U.S. anti-money laundering laws, including the
PATRIOT Act).
100

Id.

101 Id.
102 See JOHN ROTH ET AL., NAT'L COMM'N ON TERRORIST ATrACKS UPON THE U.S.,

67 (2004), available at http://www
.9-llcommission.gov/staff statements/911TerrFin Monograph.pdf
("[AllBarakaat at the time of 9/11 had more than 180 offices in 40 countries ....At the
time of the terrorist attacks, al-Barakaat was considered the largest money
remittance system operating in Somalia ...").
103 See The FinancialWar on Terrorism and the Administration's Implementation of
Title III of the USA PATRIOT Act: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., and
Urban Affairs, 107th Cong. 16 (2002) (statement of Kenneth W. Dam, Deputy
Secretary, U.S. Department of the Treasury) (discussing how shutting down alBarakaat disrupted larger flows of terrorist funding).
104 See Press Release, Executive Office of the President, Shutting Down the
Terrorist Financial Network, (Nov. 7, 2001), available at http://www.whitehouse
.gov/news/releases/2001/11/20011107-6.htm (articulating Jimale's link to alQaeda); Press Release, Executive Office of the President, President Announces
STAFF MONOGRAPH ON TERRORIST FINANCING
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These raids on one of the major hawala networks frightened
many participants throughout the terror financing community,
encouraging numerous hawalas to comply with the registration
requirements.
However, the government's case was soon
weakened as it became evident that the action was based on a
tenuous connection to terrorism. 105 Thus, the investigation served
only to freeze people's primary source of income. 10 6 Specifically,
al-Barakaat operated very similar to a bank, and thus held
individuals' assets. 107 When the U.S. government seized those
funds, many individuals were left entirely without access to their
livelihoods. Due to the concerns raised by the freezing of assets,
the international community protested the "strong-armed" tactic
used by the United States. 108 This case is directly applicable,
though, to the discussions of this Article where the question
remains how the government can best shut down those who fund
terrorism.
While the al-Barakaat case is an example of the U.S.
government proactively stepping in to shut down an entity
believed to support terrorism, it also illuminates many of the
inherent problems. For instance, the government's raid on alBarakaat, one of the largest hawala networks, occurred only in four

Crackdown on Terrorist Financial Network, (Nov. 7, 2001), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/11/20011107-4.html
(announcing a crackdown on the funding of terrorist networks). These raids led
to the U.S. seizure of $1.9 million in assets.
105 Mohamed Nimer, Muslims in America After 9-11, 7 J. ISLAMIC L. & CULTURE
1, 29 (2002).
106 See Ann C. Richard, The Money Trail: Europe Can Do More to Shut Down
Terrorist Funds, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Mar. 19, 2004, at 6 (discussing the need to
combat "loopholes" such as the use of charities which make the freezing of assets
insufficient to adequately stop terror financing); UAE Urges World to Isolate Hawala
System Abusers, UAE INTERACT, May 16, 2002, http://uaeinteract.com/docs/
UAE.urges.world-toisolateHawala.system.abusers_/4177.htm
(last visited
Oct. 4, 2007) (stating that hawala systems must isolate those who use hawalas to
fund terror); Tim Golden, 5 Months After Sanctions Against Somali Company, Scant
Proof of Qaeda Tie, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 2002, at A10 (stating that connections
between al-Barakaat and terrorist networks were "tenuous").
107 See id. (discussing how the freezing of assets prevented individuals' access
to their funds and deposits).
108 See Marc Kaufman, Somalis Said to Feel Impact of U.S. Freeze of al-Barakaat,
WASH. POST, Nov. 30, 2001, at A30 ("The Bush administration's decision this
month to freeze the funds of Somalia's al-Barakaat financial system because of
alleged links to al Qaeda terrorists has had a devastating effect on the country's
fragile economy, top U.N. officials and Somalia experts say.").
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U.S. states, 109 presumably permitting the organization to continue
its full operations elsewhere in the world. Further, the fractious
nature of hawalas shows how mere financial raids and seizures
struggle to effectively attain the ultimate goal of curbing terror
financing. If one entity is shut down, there will be a new entity on
the next block by the end of the week.
In 2002, Operation Green Quest agents arrested Mohamed
Albanna, a Yemeni-American, on charges of operating a hawala
without the requisite licensing. 110 The federal government alleged
that Albanna had transferred over $3 million into Yemen since
November 2001.111 Not only did Albanna fail to comply with the
aforementioned reporting requirement for a transfer of more than
$3,000; he also neglected to register his business with either the
112
state of New York or the federal government.
Similar to al-Barakaat, post-arrest evidence showed that the
actual ties to terrorism were more tenuous than originally believed
by prosecutors, who subsequently conceded that the money in
question was not actually used to fund terrorism." 3 Rather, many
of those who participated in Albanna's business argue that they
were simply following the religious tradition of their heritage by
114
sending money to family back home.
The final PATRIOT Act case study broadens the terror
financing question beyond just hawalas. An investigation into the
Islamic Saudi Academy, located in northern Virginia, highlights
the fact that questions of terror financing are far broader than just
hawalas, but rather apply anywhere that funds further a terrorist

109 Bruce Zagaris, The Merging of the Counter-Terrorism and Anti-Money
LaunderingRegimes, 34 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 45,68 (2002).
110 See Marc Santora, A Civic Leader is Charged in Money Transfers, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 18, 2002, at A16 (discussing Albanna's indictment).
111See Dan Herbeck, Albanna Arraignedfor Mailing Cash to Yemen, BUFFALO
NEWS, Jan. 13, 2004, at B3 (discussing charges against Albanna).
112 See Michael Beebe & Sandra Tan, Yemeni Connection: Arrests Extend to
Michigan in Federal Probe of Money Transfers, BUFFALO NEwS, Dec. 19, 2002, at B1
(advancing the proposition that no hawalas were registered in the State of New
York).
113 See Herbeck, supra note 111, at B3 (quoting U.S. Attorney Michael A. Battle
as saying, "We have never made any linkage between Mr. Albanna and terrorism.
We have charged him with running an unlicensed business for sending money.").
114 See id. (quoting the defense attorney for one of Albanna's codefendants as
saying, "A lot of people in Yemen depend on money that is sent to them from
family members in America.").
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agenda." 5 This school, although admittedly less extreme than
many madrasas in Muslim states,116 teaches grammar school and
high school students not only regular academics, but also teaches
them that a "Day of Judgment" awaits the conversion of the world
to Islam and the elimination of the Jewish people. 1 7
The Academy came under particular scrutiny when a recent
valedictorian was charged and convicted for participating in plans
to assassinate President Bush."18 Further, a member of the school's
financial board was arrested while videotaping the Chesapeake
Bay Bridge." 9
Thus, the U.S. government has begun an
investigation into the origins of the school's funding, as well as an
inquiry into the specific role played by the Saudi government. 120
The question of the Saudi influence was given some attention in
the 9/11 Commission Report, where it was noted that the Saudi
government spends funds to disseminate Wahhabi beliefs to
mosques and educational institutions around the world. 12'
These case studies highlight the tenuous balance required in
the efforts to curb terror financing. First, the above examples show
that after 9/11 the U.S. government has been willing to act in a
broad and forceful manner towards suspected financers of
terrorism. Second, though, these actions have raised great concern
among the people "on the ground" who use IVTS networks for
completely legitimate purposes. Thus, the recommendations at the
115 Letter from Charles E. Schumer, U.S. Senator, to Alberto Gonzales, Att'y
Gen. (Feb. 22, 2005), available at http://schumer.senate.gov/SchumerWebsite/
pressroom/Letters/2005/Gonzalez%20Ltr%2002.22.05.pdf [hereinafter Schumer
Letter] (detailing the involvement of alumni of the Islamic Saudi Academy in
terrorist activities).
116 Rather, these schools operate much like other religious schools within
America.
117 See Valerie Strauss & Emily Wax, Ahere Two Worlds Collide: Muslim Schools
Face Tension of Islamic, U.S. Views, WASH. POST, Feb. 25, 2002, at A01 (discussing
the tensions that mount in Muslim schools in the United States).
118 See Jerry Markon & Dana Priest, Terrorist Plot to Kill Bush Alleged, WASH.
PosT, Feb. 23, 2005, at Al (explaining the assassination plot).
119 Press Release, Sen. Charles E. Schumer, Schumer: Is Saudi Academy in
Virginia Another Madrassa? (Feb. 23, 2005), available at http://schumer.senate
.gov/SchumerWebsite/pressroom/press-releases/2005/PR41490.VAIslamic
School.022305.html.
120 See Schumer Letter, supra note 115 (urging an investigation into the
school's funding).
121 See 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 53, at 372 (stating that some
Wahhabi schools and organizations have been "exploited by extremists to further
their goal of violent jihad against non-Muslims.").
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conclusion of this discussion must take into account the delicate
balance between these often contradictory interests.
3.3.5.

What Do These Case Studies Show?

As these case studies highlight the delicate balancing needed
between governmental interests in stopping terror financing and
the "on the ground" interest in using the IVTS networks for
legitimate purposes as is, the paramount issue for this discussion
will be the determination of an appropriate balance between
interests of national security and legal money transfer systems
engaging in humanitarian work. As an example of this balancing,
in the above-discussed case studies, there were many complaints
that violations of a registration requirement cannot equal or
necessitate the freezing of assets.
However, weighing towards the government's interest, the
registration requirements are a minimal and simple way to attempt
this delicate balance in light of other possible remedies. While
hawalas often do serve a legitimate purpose, they are also "ripe for
the picking" by unscrupulous investors. As such, the government
merely requires the registration of these businesses, rather than
finding them per se illegal.
In essence, these cases demonstrate two things. On the one
hand, they show governmental power, the use of which is central
to the discussions and recommendations of this Article. On the
other hand, these case studies highlight the delicate balance
required by the government in regulating financial transactions
related to hawalas. The prosecution of these entities, as well as the
freezing of assets, should send shockwaves throughout the hawala
community, coercing compliance with fairly meager reporting
requirements.
However, such governmental actions may also serve to
embolden the unscrupulous investors and hawaladars. Clearly, the
government could avoid the problems highlighted in the alBarakaat example by employing a team of analysts to fully and
thoroughly analyze the entity in question, but such deference to
the entity would lead to multi-year government investigations, a
reality that is not practical in the world of counterterrorism. Not
only is the U.S. government engaged in a new and rapidly
changing struggle against terrorism that precludes the allotment of
such large amounts of time, but the hawalas also do not lend
themselves to such inquiries due to a complete lack of records.
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The final lesson from these case studies is the recurring theme
of a need for international cooperation. 122 If money laundering
and terror financing are treated merely as domestic crimes, the
goal of eliminating terror financing cannot be achieved. Rather,
the government must proactively establish and exercise universal
jurisdiction over this international crime. 123
The fact that terror financing takes place in more calm settings
than warfare makes it no less of a threat than an individual with a
bomb. Conversely, financiers should receive greater attention than
the foot soldiers, as there are a thousand people willing to wear a
bomb. Killing one bomber only makes room for the next person to
pick up the bomb. However, the financiers are few and far
between. Thus, taking these individuals out of circulation creates a
larger dent in the furtherance of the terrorist goals. As the "zone of
combat" in the "war on terror" is continually expanding beyond
traditional notions of warfare, 124 terror financing needs to be
included as part and parcel of this expanding "zone of combat."
4.

FOREIGN TREATMENT OF TERROR FINANCING

As has been articulated above, domestic efforts to curb terror
financing must simultaneously take an international perspective.
Thus, it is important not only to discuss the specific international
treatment of terror financing, as discussed earlier, but also to
discuss the current steps being taken in foreign jurisdictions- such
as Israel, Iraq, and England - to curb terror financing.
4.1. Israel
Any discussion of the world's interaction with terrorism must
begin with Israel, as there is no better laboratory for
122 As evidenced by the fact that a purely domestic raid of four store-front alBarakaat operations cannot serve to effectively curb al-Barakaat's international
funding of terrorism. See Kaufman, supra note 108 (reviewing major U.S.
government initiatives to combat transnational financing of terrorism); Zagaris,
supra note 109 (discussing the impact on Somalia of the U.S. freeze of al-Barakaat).
123 The United States currently asserts jurisdiction over extraterritorial
abductions regardless of where they occur in the world under universal
jurisdiction. See Gregory S. McNeal & Brian J. Field, Snatch-and-Grab Ops:
Justifying ExtraterritorialAbduction, 16 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 491, 522
(2007) (discussing extraterritorial abductions and the need for an international
involvement in setting appropriate standards of protocol).
124 Where the "zone of combat" is beyond merely the actual places of
fighting, to include anywhere that supporters of terrorism act.
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A starting point for
counterterrorism measures and efforts.
discussing Israel's response to terror financing is the Prohibition of
Financing Terrorism Law of 2004 ("PFTL").125 The PFTL was
passed in direct response to the United Nations' International
Convention for the Suppression of Financing Terrorism, a
resolution specifically defining terror financing as an offense and
encouraging nations to enact legislative measures intended to
126
identify, locate, and seize funds intended for terror financing.
Although this international convention was passed in 1999,
well before the 9/11 attacks, it was not until after the attacks that
the United Nations Security Council enacted Resolution 1373,
specifically calling on states to work jointly against terror financing
by complying with the Convention. 27 Specifically, Resolution
1373 created an international obligation for nations to criminalize
activities related to terror financing, criminalize possessing assets
on the behalf of others connected to terrorism, and allow for the
freezing of assets known to be tied to terrorism. 128 Further,
Resolution 1373 created the Counterterrorism Committee, a body
assigned the task of watching over the implementation of the
Resolution in all states. 129 The general goal of this Resolution, and
of the committee charged with its oversight, is to broaden the
world's efforts to combat terrorism by requiring all states to
130
participate in preventing terror financing.

125 The Prohibition of Financing Terrorism Law, 2005, S.H. 1973, translated in
http://www.justice.gov.il/NR/rdonlyres/4FE9E898-1264-4561-B7AA-0957F6DE
A67A/0/ProhibitionTerroristFinancing.doc.
of the Financing of
126 International Convention for the Suppression
Terrorism, Dec. 9, 1999, 2178 U.N.T.S. 229 (adopting measures for the prevention
of the financing of terrorism and its suppression through the prosecution and
punishment of its perpetrators).
127 See S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001) (requesting that
states prevent and suppress the financing of terrorist acts through criminalization
of the willful provision or collection of funds that will be involved in terrorist acts
and freezing of assets of people who commit, participate, facilitate, or attempt acts
of terrorism).

128

Id.

129

Id.
The White House described 1373 as articulating "new, strict standards for

130

all states to meet in the global war against terrorism."

THE WHITE HOUSE,

18 (Feb. 2003), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/counter terrorism/
counterterrorism.strategy.pdf (providing an overview of the terrorist threat
today and the national security goals and objectives of the U.S. government).
NATIONAL

STRATEGY

FOR

COMBATING
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The Israeli government's passing of the PFTL highlights the
international response needed in combating terror financing.
Terror financing is not an offense which can be handled solely
through existing domestic frameworks. Rather, Israel realized the
need to subjugate domestic law to an international standard. Thus,
the PFTL provides Israeli authorities greater strength in combating
terror financing, as they must now act under international
31
standards in addition to domestic standards.'
For example, Israeli authorities have established provisions for
criminalizing the act of rewarding a terrorist action, classifying an
entity as an international "terrorist organization" with no
connection to Israel, handling an Israeli citizen who finds himself
involved in a monetary transaction with suspected terrorist
connections, and-the strongest provision instituted by the
international standards -permitting the Israel government to
132
administratively seize money with suspected ties to terrorism.
4.2. Iraq
Under the newly instituted government in Iraq, the immediate
attention given to terror financing is worth noting. In 2004, the
Coalition Provisional Authority ("CPA")133 instituted an AntiMoney Laundering Act ("AMLA").34
This law criminalizes
money laundering and terror financing in an effort to secure the
newly formed financial sector within Iraq. Specifically, the CPA
instituted jurisdiction over banking institutions by instituting
vigilance requirements. 1 35 The AMLA also delegated authority to
the Iraqi Central Bank to create and publish additional restrictions
136
and regulations in the future.

131 See Bernadette M. Chala et al., The Middle East, 39 INT'L LAW. 597, 607-11
(2005) (describing the PFTL and its effects).
132 Id. at 607-09.
133 For a description of the Coalition Provisional Authority, see Tom Parker,
Prosecuting Saddam: The Coalition ProvisionalAuthority and the Evolution of the Iraqi
Special Tribunal, 38 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 899 (2005).
134 Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2004, Coal. Provisional Auth. Order No. 93
(June 3, 2004) (Iraq), available at http://www.cpa-iraq.org/regulations/
20040603 CPAORD 93 Anti-MoneyLaunderingAct of_ 2004 withAnnex.pdf
(criminalizing money laundering and structured transactions that finance crime
and terrorism, defining responsibility and obligations of financial institutions and
methods of enforcement).
135 Id. arts. 15-23.
136 Id. art. 7(1)(b).
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In further addressing terror financing, the CPA acknowledged
the need to revamp the Iraqi banking industry itself. CPA Order
94: (1) included a definition for "senior bank official"; (2)
consolidated the authority of the Central Bank by providing that
actions by government entities, other than the Central Bank, which
impact matters subject to the Central Bank's jurisdiction shall be
without legal force; (3) removed a limit on the total number of
bank licenses controlled by foreign persons; (4) permitted
foreigners to hold shares in existing or new domestic banks; and
(5) reserved the provision that foreign banks shall maintain assets
in Iraq in excess of their liabilities to Iraqi residents if required by
the Central Bank. 137
Although it may be too soon to discuss Iraqi examples for
lessons of effectiveness, this example is helpful in enunciating the
international recognition of terror financing as an immediate threat
necessitating attention.
4.3. England
The United Kingdom has extensive experience with terror
financing, in part because of its struggle with the Irish Republican
Army ("IRA"). 138 In response to the IRA, the U.K. government has
worked to cut off terror financing by focusing legislation on
robberies and tax fraud. However, as the IRA moved into the
political sphere, it began to use more sophisticated networks of
organized crime. Thus, the United Kingdom's focus turned
toward drug money in the effort to curb terror financing. The
events of 9/11 did not radically shake-up the U.K. legislative
efforts against terror financing; rather the United Kingdom merely
tweaked the existing standards in an effort to more effectively stop
139
terror financing.
The first major anti-terrorism legislation in the United
Kingdom was the Terrorism Act of 2000.140 However, despite this
137 Banking Law of 2004, Coal. Provisional Auth. Order No. 94 (June 6, 2004)
(Iraq),
available
at
http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20040607
_CPAORD94_BankingLaw of_2004_with_ AnnexA.pdf (establishing a banking
system for the promotion of economic growth and development in Iraq).
138 See, e.g., Laura K. Donohue, Anti-Terrorist Finance in the United Kingdom
and United States, 27 MICH. J. INT'L L. 303 (2006) (examining the limitations of
current U.K. and U.S. anti-terrorist finance laws and efforts, and the need to move
beyond the traditional anti-money laundering tools).
139

Id.

140

Terrorism Act, 2000, c. 11. (Eng.) (detailing the types of criminal activities
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enactment, the attacks of 9/11 brought English legislators back to
the table to further expand counterterrorism law in the United
Kingdom. This led to the Anti-terrorism Crime and Security
Act, 141 which established the power of the government to
142
confiscate money believed to have ties to terrorist organizations.
This legislation operates as a check by stripping the judiciary of
jurisdiction regarding the freezing of assets located outside of the
143
United Kingdom.
Beyond broadening the government's power to seize assets, the
legislation also made it a criminal offense to operate in the
"regulated sector" and not inform law enforcement of suspicious
activity.'" In short, the response from the United Kingdom to the
escalation of international terrorism follows very closely to legal
developments within the United States. The British government
acted to ensure that (a) people putting money into the financial
system were regulated and that (b) people working in the financial
system were also regulated.
The brief discussion of terror financing legislation in Israel,
Iraq, and England highlights the fact that (a) this is not merely an
issue for the United States to consider, and (b) that these
international actors need to pool their resources together in order
to cast an international net to fight terror financing.
5.

FREEDOM OF RELIGION

The discussion thus far has focused on the necessity of
government action against terror financing. However, as with any
counterterrorism discussion, there are ancillary concerns. For
instance, when discussing coercive interrogation, the ancillary
consideration is the question of constitutional rights and
protections extending to non-citizen detainees. In discussing
targeted killing, the ancillary question is the juxtaposition of a
associated with terrorism and counter-terrorist tactics supported by the
government as well as procedures for the prosecution and punishment of certain
offenses related to terrorism).
141 Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act, 2001, c. 24, (Eng.).
142 Id. § 1.
143 If the Treasury believes that a non-U.K. entity is a threat to British
nationals, the Treasury official institutes a statutory provision to seize that entity's
assets for 28 days (a time period which can be extended by an order of
Parliament), Id.§ 10(3).
144 Id. § 17-20 (extending disclosure powers but placing restrictions on certain
disclosures).
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state's interest in security against an individual's interest in
physical autonomy. In discussing terror financing, an ancillary
145
question is the freedom of religion.
Specifically, the question here is the interplay between the
governmental eradication of terror financing and the protection of
one's freedom to exercise religion. After 9/11, the United States
has been willing to act in a heavy handed manner in the name of
national security, and the Muslim community often suffers some of
the hardest blows. However, many see the role of Islam in the
9/11 attacks as justifying such governmental actions.
It is
important to note, though, that everything done in the halls of the
American government establishes precedent.
What is today
affecting the Islamic community could just as easily be turned
against Christian or Jewish communities in the future. The goal is
to recognize the great need for targeting terror financing while still
preserving the freedom of religion.
Before discussing the specific balance of national security and
the freedom of religion, it is important to understand the specific
contours of the freedom of religion itself. The importance given by
the framers of the Constitution to religious freedom in the United
States makes the United States unique in comparison to many
other governmental frameworks. For example, the Muslim world
presents numerous examples of restricting religious freedoms,
such as the story of Dhabihu'llah Mahrami, who, having long been
146
of the Bahi'i faith, was imprisoned for ten years for apostasy.
5.1.

In general

Religion first appears in the U.S. Constitution in the "Test Oath
Clause" of Article VI: "[N]o religious Test shall ever be required as
a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United
States." 147 This clause was clearly inserted as a rejection of
England's historical requirement that all political office holders
swear allegiance to the Church of England, or at least to
Protestantism in general. Thus, the "Test Oath Clause" prohibits
the insertion of any religious litmus test into the qualifications of
holding office in the United States.
145 U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof ....).
146 See Ray Rivera, Bahais Mourn Iranian Jailed for His Faith, WASH. POST, Jan.
30, 2006, at B3 (describing the Iranian government's persecution of Bah6'is).
147 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3.
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When developing the Bill of Rights, the framers referred to the
freedom of religion as the "first freedom." 148 As pointed out by
Grace Smith of the Heritage Foundation, this right was listed first
because:
[R]eligious freedom is a natural right that cannot justly be
withheld. Its importance is underscored in the Second
Vatican Council's declaration on religious liberty, Dignitatis
Humanae, which recently celebrated its 40th anniversary.
Promulgated by Pope Paul VI on Dec. 7, 1965, the
document reasserts the Catholic Church's teaching that
religious freedom is a right that innately belongs to every
individual simply because of his or her humanness.
"The right of man to religious freedom has its foundation in
the dignity of the person," it reads, "whose exigencies have
come to be . . . fully known to human reason through
centuries of experience." Here is a religious claim about
human dignity that can resonate with Catholics and nonCatholics alike in its appeal to reason, experience and moral

intuition. 149
Delving further into history to understand the contours of
America's freedom of religion, Congressman James Madison of
Virginia and Congressman Fischer Ames of Massachusetts were
both instrumental in the adoption of this clause. 50 These two
individuals highlight two central reasons for having a freedom of
religion clause in the United States. First, Massachusetts still had
churches in 1790 that were established by state law. Thus,
Congressman Ames noted the problems that would arise if the

148 See Grace V. Smith, Forum: Rethinking the First Freedom, WASH. TIMES,
March 12, 2006, at B5 (discussing the persistent resistance to the notion of
religious liberty around the world despite the increasing popularity of
democratic).
149 Id.
150 See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 766 Uoseph Gales ed., 1834) ("On motion of Mr.
Ames, the fourth amendment was altered as to read 'Congress shall make no law
establishing religion, or to prevent the free exercise thereof, or to infringe the
rights of conscience."'); id. at 434 (statement of Rep. Madison) ("The civil rights of
none shall be abridged on account of religious belief or worship, nor shall any
national religion be established, nor shall the full and equal rights of conscience be
in any manner, or on any pretext, infringed.").
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Federal Congress ever decided to establish a federal church.' 51
This foresight led to Ames demanding the prohibition of Congress
to institute religion. 152 Second, then, was concern for unity
amongst the American states. There were clearly differences in
religious and theological beliefs among the states (as noted by the
presence of Congregationalists, Baptists, Quakers, Methodists, and
Episcopalians). 5 3 Thus, instituting freedom of religion would
serve to prevent conflicts from trying to coalesce all of these
religious vantage points into one cohesive church. 54
This protection of the freedom of religion, however, has posed
many great dilemmas throughout American history. While not at
issue in this discussion, some examples of the issues raised include
whether religious groups may meet on public grounds, whether
bankruptcy laws may prohibit or curtail one's tithing, whether
religious groups may act in the political sphere, and whether the
Pledge of Allegiance may have the words "under god" contained
therein. 155 The question raised in this Article, however, is whether
one's freedom to religion means a freedom to donate money under
the name of religion (such as the giving of money to hawala
brokers) without any government intrusion or oversight. An
additional question, which extends thereon, is whether
151 See, e.g., Noah Feldman, The Intellectual Origins of the Establishment Clause,
77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 346 (2002) (analyzing the ideas and arguments used in the early
debates regarding the separation of church and state).
152 Id. at 403.
153 Id. at 372-74.
154 See Russell Kirk, Distinguished Scholar, Heritage Found., Speech at The
Heritage Foundation marking the U.S. Constitution's bicentennial: The First
Clause of the First Amendment: Politics and Religion (Dec. 9, 1987) (transcript
available at http://www.heritage.org/Research/PoliticalPhilosophy/upload/
92736_l.pdf) (explaining reasons that existed for advocating the religion clause of
the First Amendment).
155 See generally Francis J. Beckwith, The Court of Disbelief. The Constitution's
Article VI Religious Test Prohibitionand the Judiciary's Religious Motive Analysis, 33
HASTINGS CoNST. L.Q. 337 (2006) (criticizing the courts for employing a religious
motive analysis that targets beliefs and violates Article IV); Tara P. Beglin, Note,
"One Nation Under God," Indeed: The Ninth Circuit's Problematic Decision to Change
Our Pledge of Allegiance, 20 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 129 (2005) (arguing that
the Ninth Circuit erred in ruling that a school's policy of reciting the Pledge
violated the First Amendment's Establishment Clause); Michael Stokes Paulsen, A
Funny Thing Happened on the Way to the Limited Public Forum: Unconstitutional
Conditions on "Equal Access" for Religious Speakers and Groups, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
653, 653 (1996) (arguing that the Constitution does not authorize or permit the
government to discriminate against religious speakers on the basis of religious
content, viewpoint, or religious identity of the speaker).
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governmental oversight creates fear in potential givers, which
could cause them to feel that their freedom of religion is being
abridged. While the post-9/11 world may warrant the application
of stringent governmental oversight, such a response is no more
permissible than stating that one's freedom to religion is absolute
and that Muslims ought to have unfettered access to the hawala
system to practice their religious obligations. Neither extreme may
be held as permissible; rather, the two must be balanced against
each other.
5.2.

Freedom of Religion Applied to Terror Financing

Is it a violation of one's freedom of religion to require IVTS
networks to register? Is it a violation of one's freedom of religion
to require banks to "know their customers"? Is it a violation of
one's freedom of religion to require people giving money through
an IVTS to provide identification and maintain a paper trail? The
answer to all of these is no. The government must be able to enact
legislation in the name of counterterrorism, and, as terror financing
is at issue in such an effort, legislation must be permitted to impact
the financial markets and transfer systems without an overly
burdensome concern for a tangential impact on religious freedom.
At the outset, it is incorrect to suggest that freedoms are
absolute. This interpretation would become cognizable to anyone
who chooses to go into a crowded movie theatre and yell "fire." 156
Despite a right to free speech, there are limitations, one being that
you cannot yell "fire" in a crowded area without the existence of
an actual fire. 157 Thus, this discussion must begin with an
understanding that even though we hold our rights closely in the
United States, they are all subject to some level of limitation, the
question merely being how much limitation.
In the 1990s, the United States was forced to address a new
contour of the freedom of religion debate. Specifically at issue was
156 See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (stating that the nature
of an act is largely dependant on the circumstances surrounding the behavior);
Robert Tsai, Fire,Metaphor, and ConstitutionalMyth-Making, 93 GEO. L.J. 181,196-97
(2004) (discussing how the fire metaphor used by the Supreme Court serves an
important function in legal culture by creating an image of unprotected
expression).
157 See Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52 (equating the panic caused by a false alarm with
other harms the government has an interest in preventing); Tsai, supra note 156, at
196-97 (explaining the powerful nature of the fire imagery used by courts in
constructing legal analogies).
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the scope of governmental restrictions on the right of citizens to
freely practice their religion. In Employment Division v. Smith, 5 8 the
U.S. Supreme Court held that the Free Exercise Clause does not
protect religiously-motivated conduct from legislation that is
"neutral" and "generally" applicable. 159 This decision, however,
was decried across the country, and Congress immediately
responded by adopting the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
("RFRA"), which restored the traditional views of religious
160
freedoms.
RFRA responded to the Court's elimination of the "compelling
interest test" for cases where the government has burdened one's
freedom to exercise their religion. Specifically, RFRA states that
the government "shall not substantially burden a person's exercise
of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general
applicability." 161
However, Congress's re-articulation of the
freedom of religion was not without limitations. Rather, it limited
its own rule by noting that such a holding is excepted, as the
government may apply a burden if there is a compelling
governmental interest, and it does so by using the least restrictive
means of furthering the stated compelling governmental
62
interest.1
Thus, although both the Court and Congress attempted to
more clearly address this issue of how much the government may
step into one's practice of religion, the question remains unsettled.
It is clear, though, that some governmental intrusion is permitted.
In balancing national security and the freedom of religion in
the context of regulating the financial sector, the operative question
concerns the centrality of giving money through IVTS networks to
Islam. This is the central question because the more fundamental
the use of IVTS networks is to Islam, the greater the impact
regulations may have on religious freedom. The Specifically
Designated Terrorist ("SDT") list, created by President Clinton's
Executive Order 12,947, serves as an effective analytical tool. 1 63
494 U.S. 872 (1990).
159 This is important here because the government could potentially
promulgate very restrictive rules so long as they do not identify a specific religion
or class of people.
160 Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2000).
161 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(a).
162 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b)(1)-(2).
163 Prohibiting Transactions with Terrorists Who Threaten to Disrupt the
Middle East Peace Process, Exec. Order No. 12,947, 60 Fed. Reg. 5079 (Jan. 25,
158
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This list was then broadened by President Bush after the 9/11
attacks through Executive Order 13,224, which created the
Specially Designated Global Terrorist ("SDGT") blacklist.164 This
second list broaden Clinton's list through the inclusion of global
terrorists, rather than only groups participating in the Middle East
peace process. The creation of both of these lists raised multiple
freedom of religion claims from charities on the blacklists.
To examine the question of whether the government's
legislative action against SDGTs comports with the Constitution's
freedom of religion, a discussion of the Holy Land Foundation
("HLF") case 165 is illuminative. HLF argued, similar to many other
SDGT organizations, that the blacklist was in violation of RFRA,
166
and thus was a violation of the freedom of religion in general.
167
In Holy Land Foundationfor Relief and Development v. Ashcroft,
the District Court for the District of Columbia employed two lines
The Court first analyzed HLF's argument of
of analysis.
substantial burden on its free exercise of religion, and secondly the
court analyzed HLF's argument of substantial burden on behalf of
HLF's donors and employees. 168 In short, HLF argued that their
work in accepting and using donations from Muslims was the
"free exercise of religion" as such actions fulfilled the Islamic
religious obligation of zakat.169
The court responded by holding that HLF failed to show that it
was, in fact, a religious organization rather than just a "nonprofit
charitable corporation." 170 Thus, if an entity is found not to be a
religious organization, it follows that there is no need to reach a
discussion of RFRA.1 71 The second holding, then, is not applicable
here, as the court rested its denial on a question of the standing of
HLF to raise an argument on behalf of third parties. 172 Applicable
1995).
164 Blocking Property and Prohibiting Transactions with Persons Who
Commit, Threaten to Commit, or Support Terrorism, Exec. Order No. 13,224, 66
Fed. Reg. 49,079 (Sept. 25, 2001).
Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 219 F. Supp. 2d 57
165
(D.D.C. 2002), affid, 333 F.3d 156 (D.C. Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1218 (2004).
166 Id.
167

Id.

168

Id. at 83-84.

169

Id.

170

Id.
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb.
Holy Land, 219 F. Supp. 2d at 84.

171
172

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol29/iss1/2

20071

ACHILLES' HEEL OF TERRORISM

here, though, is the dicta from the D.C. Circuit where the Court
held that HLF was participating in the furtherance of terrorism,
and, as terrorism is not mandated by any religion, promoting
terrorism is not protected. 173 Thus, this case shows that legislation
prohibiting the financing of terrorism cannot in and of itself be
argued as a violation of the freedom of religion clause because the
financing of terrorism cannot be argued to be an exercise of
religion. However, such a broad statement may fail to recognize
that legislation aimed at terrorism has tangential impact that
infringes on a particular right. As such, the operative issue
remains: balancing.
Although this discussion highlights the proposition that the
government possesses the power to enact legislation aimed at the
institutions purportedly financing terrorism, the corollary question
is whether the government can do so if such actions impact the
donor. Similar to the judicial response to the IVTSs, which would
be the same as the response to HLF's arguments, an individual
donor must show that his or her act of giving money to an IVTS is
a "religious act," that the entity receiving the money is a religious
organization, and that the legislation unduly infringes on the use
of the IVTS. Donors would have to emphasize that these entities
and charities exist not merely for their humanitarian work, but
rather for their direct role in providing a place for Muslims to
practice zakat.
However, the SDGT list and other financial actions against
purported financiers of terrorism merely prohibit the use of
charities and monies for terrorism. Thus, unless terrorism is a
religious mandate, then both charities and donors lack standing to
raise such arguments. Implicit, though, in this balance is the fact
that the discussion is not truly this black-and-white. The IVTS
may, in fact, be used as an avenue for religious exercise, and the
anti-terror financing legislation may only be targeted at giving
money to terrorism. But an individual may feel unduly spied upon
by any anti-terror financing legislation despite the person's wholly
innocent use of the IVTS network.
There remains a delicate balance between the desires for a
broad freedom of religion in the United States and an
173 See Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 156, 167
(D.C. Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1218 (2004) ("Acting against the funding of
terrorism does not violate the free exercise rights protected by RFRA and the First
Amendment. There is no free exercise right to fund terrorists.").
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understanding that actions currently permitted towards the
Muslim community could tomorrow stand as precedent for actions
against the Christian or Jewish communities. Nevertheless, there is
still a distinct and palpable competing governmental interest in
eradicating the financing of terrorism.
6.

CONCLUDING RECOMMENDATIONS

Given the panoply of interests at stake, it is important to find
the proper balance of both national security and religious freedom.
The government of the United States, through the Department of
Justice, has a duty to act in a proactive way to eliminate terrorism.
In doing so through a proper balancing of all interests, any
recommendations must respect: (1) the freedom of religion, (2) the
free market, and (3) the need for national security.
With these considerations in mind, the approach is two-fold.
First, the government bears responsibility to guarantee that their
actions are both effective and not overly broad. Second, from the
grassroots, "man-on-the-street" perspective, there are enormous
responsibilities in making sure that people will not abuse the IVTS
networks in support of terrorism. To this end, the following
recommendations aim at both the "top-down" governmental role
and the "bottom-up" individual role in attempting to orchestrate a
system that will both curb the financing of terrorism while
protecting one's right to free exercise of religion:
(1) All persons operating any form of an Informal Value
Transfer System must register with the federal government by
providing contact information and a registered address. Further,
the definition of IVTS needs to be broad enough to cover any
derivation thereof. This will provide the Department of Justice
with a list of entities engaging in the above described financial
activities, allowing for easier monitoring of the specific legality of
the IVTS's activities. Effective monitoring should help to prevent
broad freezing of assets.
(2) When the government freezes the assets of an entity, the
government must proactively look through the registered
transactions to decipher which of them did not support terrorism.
Those transactions that are then found not to support terrorism
must be restored as quickly as possible.
(3) A record of all transfers made through any form of an IVTS
must be kept by both the IVTS agent and the consumer
transferring the money. This will provide an easier window
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through which to view legality, making it far more likely that the
government will not need to broadly shut down organizations due
to a lack of information.
(4) In the event that an IVTS is suspicious that its system is
being used for the illicit purposes of financing terrorism, the IVTS
agent must both refuse to effectuate such a transfer as well as
notify the proper governmental authorities.
(5) The government must be able to articulate a prima facie case
for any action that either shuts down an IVTS or freezes the assets
of such an entity. This requirement will serve to prevent the
government from overstepping its authority in sweeping actions.
(6) Anti-terrorism financing legislation must require oversight
and registration for any sum of money transferred. Caps, whether
they be $10,000 or $3,000, are too easily abused where no
obligations exist for transferring sums under the limits.
(7) The United States government must take a proactive
approach to IVTSs and hawalas where the government investigates
the existence thereof, rather than tacitly using reporting
requirements. Under this proactive approach, the government
would have an enforcement wing whose sole duty is to find IVTS
networks existing on American streets. This is not to proactively
shut these entities down; rather, the job is to only make a record of
the network's existence, so as to make monitoring easier.
(8) The United States needs to use its international weight to
coerce other nations to institute similar legislative mechanisms
aimed at eliminating terrorist financing. Without international
support, the domestic efforts in the United States are moot, as
financiers can simply go to other countries for such transactions.
(9) Enforcement cannot target only a small number of storefront operations, but rather must address the entity as a whole.
Many IVTS networks have significant operations around the
world. Thus, enforcement actions must be aimed at the central
organization, not just the person on the street.
(10) Traditional concepts of money laundering cannot be used
in fighting terrorist financing; rather, the government must look for
any illicit intent, not whether the money itself is "clean" or "dirty"
at the time of the transfer. Transferring "clean" money must make
the money illegal immediately upon either a showing of a future
intent to support terrorism or willful blindness of such support.
(11) Any efforts to curb the financing of terrorism must take
significant steps to proactively protect the freedom of religious
exercise.
When establishing limits and procedures for IVTS
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networks, such procedures cannot be so burdensome that they
infringe on one's freedom to practice one's religion. But, from the
ground level, individuals using IVTS networks must recognize the
abuses being perpetrated upon these networks, and, in
acknowledging those abuses, they must accept a heightened
amount of scrutiny.
The matter of containing and eliminating terrorism is clearly
multifaceted.
The goal of this discussion has been to first
illuminate one of the most powerful and dangerous aspects of
terrorism, the use of regular financial markets. From there we
examined whether approaching terrorist financing in the same way
as traditional money laundering was a proper venture.
Unfortunately, the discussions above, as well as the 9/11 attacks
themselves, show that such treatment was not, in fact, sufficient.
Lastly, the above discussion employed the essential tool of
balancing. The act of balancing when formulating effective antiterrorism financing legislation considers the government's interest
in protecting the citizenry and the competing interest of the
individual's freedom to freely exercise religion.
Throughout this morass of interests, the concluding
recommendations highlight that the answers are neither purely
governmental nor individual. Rather, the government and the
people must each take up their own responsibilities to effectuate an
end to the abuse of financial markets in the name of financing
terrorism.
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